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In this paper I analyze and summarize a broad list of different merger motives that has been 
proposed in the literature. I propose a categorization of such motives based on the residual 
claimant of the mergers gains, namely the owners or the managers of the merging firms, and 
on welfare effects. I also review the different empirical methods that have been proposed to 
investigate for merger motives, gains and effects.  
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1.1.  Introduction 
 
In this chapter I summarize and analyze a broad list of different rationales that have 
been proposed as motives for mergers and acquisitions. Some of them rely on the theory of 
industrial organization and refer to enhancement of the market power, efficiency gains and 
preemptive motives. Some others rely on corporate governance theories and refer to motives 
such  as  the  correction  of  internal  inefficiencies,  agency  problems  and  capital  market 
imperfections. To facilitate our exposition I have classified the list of merger rationales into 
two main groups. The key distinction between these two groups of merger motives is the 
effective claimant of the (seeking) merger gains. The first group includes drivers that increase 
the value of the merging firms because they raise actual or future profits and in which the 
effective claimants are therefore the owners of the firms, i.e., the shareholders. The second 
group includes a list of rationales that go in the interest of the manager of the firm and not 
necessarily  in  the  firm’s  value.  That  is,  the  rationale  in  these  mergers  is  to  increase  the 
acquiring firm manager’s wealth even if this may result in a decrease of the firm’s value. This 
distinction is important because making a firm more valued by means of efficiency gains or 
the exercise of market power implies welfare effects. In contrast, managerial gains should not 
reflect any welfare effect and should therefore not give rise to any antitrust concern.
2 None of 
these motives need to be the rational of a merger nor should they be considered as exhaustive. 
We also review the different empirical methods that have been proposed to investigate 
for  merger  motives  and  evaluate  merger  gains  and  effects.  I  group  them  too  into  three 
categories according to the different statistical tools and databases they employ. Two of them 
perform reduced-form analysis of either stock market prices or accounting profits as measures 
of  profitability.  The  third  one  performs  structural-form  analysis  of  oligopoly  models  of 
competition to analyze economic profits. The first two techniques make use of cross sectional 
and/or  panel  (cross  sectional  alongside  time)  datasets  involving  several  mergers  and 
acquisitions that are not necessarily related among each other. The remaining category makes 
use of data (cross sectional or panel) concerning the specific merger taking place, that is, the 
analysis in on a case-by-case basis.  
                                                 
2In our classification, some rationales to merge that belong to the first group do not necessarily imply any 
welfare effect either. These motives are the financial costs savings and the disciplinary takeovers. See 1.2.1.4 
and 1.2.1.7. 
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Before  listing  the  different  motives  behind  mergers  and  acquisitions  I  consider 
relevant to first define what these transactions are at all. Even though both terms, mergers and 
acquisitions, refer to corporate reorganizations that serve to transfer ownership control from 
one firm (the target) to the other (the acquirer), strictly speaking, they are different. Their 
distinction is however sometimes ambiguous. Hirshleifer (1995) affirms that both transactions 
fall into the more general concept of takeovers. In turn, takeovers may be friendly or hostile. 
Jenkinson and Mayer (1994) state that it is when the target firm’s manager initially rejects the 
acquisition offer that the takeover turns into hostile. The explicit difference of mergers and 
acquisitions relies on how the transaction is announced to the target company and on how the 
new corporation structure results affected. In mergers, the takeover bid is proposed to the 
representative manager of the firm and in acquisitions directly to the owners of the firm (the 
shareholders). That is the reason why acquisitions also fall under the heading of tender offer, 
i.e., a takeover bid in the form of a public invitation to shareholders to sell their stock. Then, 
in acquisitions shareholders make independent decisions about their own shares.  Once the bid 
is  accepted,  the  new  entity  might  be  legally  combined  but  not  necessarily  economically 
combined  because  the  merged  firm  may  still  run  separate  plants.  Some  times  the  term 
acquisition also refers to those deals in which the acquirer only buys minority shares or voting 
rights of the target. That is, acquisitions also refer to cases in which only part of the company 
is bought. In contrast, in mergers shareholders altogether vote to make a collective decision 
about the proposed bid. According to Hirshleifer (1995), in mergers the involved firms cease 
to have separate identity and combine to one surviving entity.  
Most empirical studies that use large samples of mergers and acquisitions to evaluate 
the gains and effects of mergers do not explicitly distinguish among these two types of deals. 
In case-by-case studies, analysts refer to mergers and not to acquisitions, either because they 
consider them as equal, or because they are built up from theoretical oligopoly models for 
which the previous distinctions are not relevant in the analysis.  
In both, the theoretical and the empirical literature, another distinct classification of 
mergers has been extensively employed. This classification does not refer to motives but to 
types, which differ according to the business structure of the merging  firms. See Hughes 
(1980),  Tirole  (1988)  and  Shy  (1995).  Mergers  are  defined  as  horizontal,  vertical  and 
conglomerate. Mergers are considered as horizontal when the two companies are in direct 
competition and share the same product lines and markets. They are considered as vertical 
when one is a costumer of the other, i.e., when they have a downstream-upstream structure in 
which the former buys inputs to the latter to produce the final output. Finally, mergers are   - 4 - 
considered as conglomerate when firms are in different markets and/or do not have business 
lines in common. In practice, when performing empirical studies, the type of the merger is 
determined by matching their SIC (standard industrial classification) digits. For instance, if 
the 4-digits of the two firms coincide, the merger is considered as horizontal, if the first 2-
digits coincide, the merger is considered as vertical, and when none of the 4-digits coincide, 
the merger is said to be conglomerate.
 3   
According  to  Martin  Lipton  (2006)  mergers  emerged  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
century in the US and since then, they have occurred in waves. Each wave is characterized by 
a concentration of the type of merger and specific industries. The very first wave started with 
horizontal mergers at the beginning of the 1900s and it has been called the wave of mergers 
for monopoly. The reason for the monopoly adjective is that many firms with small stand-
alone market shares consolidated forming high concentrations. These corporations used the 
word  trusts  for  their business  arrangements  and big  trusts became big  monopolies  which 
ended up raising anticompetitive concerns. This is what led the emergence of the antitrust law 
in the US. The industries involved in such consolidations were mostly the Steel Oil, Railroad, 
Telephone and Mining. The strict antitrust enforcement starting in the 1904 and the first war 
world might have been the factors that stopped this wave of mergers. The second merger 
wave took place also mainly in the US during the decade of the 1920s and was characterized 
by vertical mergers. During this period, the giant automobile manufacturers emerged and the 
public utility sector was particularly involved too. Ford, for example had integrated railroads 
and steel suppliers, among others, to the end-user production stage, i.e., the assembled car. It 
seems that the 1929 Crash and the Great Depression determined the end of this wave.  
Later  in  the  1960s  a  third  wave  of  mergers  of  conglomerates  with  purposes  of 
diversification was observed. Many major established companies adopted the diversification 
concept and spread out their business lines into new industries and areas of research activity. 
Because of the proper character of diversification many industries were involved in this wave. 
The stocks of conglomerated companies significantly decreased at the end of the 1960s which 
induced a break in the growth of these transactions. The fourth wave, occurring in the 1980s 
has been called the wave of disciplinary mergers. Hypotheses of the market for corporate 
                                                 
3A merger case may well involve all aspects in a single transaction, that is, it can have a horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate dimension at the same time. An example is the General Electric (GE)/Honeywell merger proposed 
in 2001. The horizontal dimension was present because both firms competed in the jet engines market. The 
vertical  nature  was present because both firms have a  manufacturer-retailer relationship. The reason is that 
Honeywell produces engine controls used by GE in the production of engines and GE is a buyer of Honeywell 
products since the former buys aeroplanes through its subsidiary company GECAS. Finally the conglomerate 
aspect was present because in several product markets only one of the merging firms is present (since they are 
both multiproduct firms).   - 5 - 
control from the corporate governance theory where applied here to understand this merger 
wave. The disciplinary adjective is due to the fact that these mergers largely occurred in a 
hostile takeover environment which involved a replacement of the target’s manager. The most 
affected industries of this wave were the Banking and Financial Services ones. 
In the 1990s, a fifth wave involving size increasing mergers has been observed. The 
drivers of these deals appeared to be the conviction that size matters to compete in the market. 
Many of the most prominent mergers were neither purely horizontal nor purely conglomerate. 
Rather  they  presented  market  extensions  of  companies  in  the  same  industry  that  served 
different and currently non-competing markets. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) affirm that the 
key  factors  facilitating  this  wave  were  market  deregulation  and  privatization.  Andrade 
Mitchell and Stafford (2001) affirm that another important factor facilitating this wave was 
the technology shock of the internet revolution. The most remarkable mergers of this wave 
were  concentrated  in  the  Banking  and  Financial  Services  as  well  as  in  the 
Telecommunications, Entertainment, Media and Technology industries. At the end of 2000 
this wave experienced a slowdown apparently due to a collapse in the internet stocks and the 
earnings and financial problems of the Telecommunications industry. Finally, from 2002 to 
nowadays  a  considerable  increase  of  giant  mergers  has  been  observed  worldwide  in  the 
Telecommunications industry again. Until now, the turmoil of the credit market in the US and 
the instability in the worldwide stock markets have not interrupted this wave of mergers. The 
reason might be that such downturn in the financial market makes targets less expensive and 
so the right moment to buy. 
What  about  the  welfare  consequences  of  mergers?  Economic  theory  and  antitrust 
practitioners often regard welfare as consumer surplus rather than overall economic surplus 
(including  producer  surplus).  They  evaluate  then  the  effects  of  mergers  on  the  involved 
market products’ prices, quality, diversity of choice and innovation (new products) since these 
are the factors that directly affect consumer surplus. This assessment is based on the type of 
the merger. Motta (2004) summarizes that, whereas horizontal and vertical mergers posses 
antitrust concerns, conglomerate mergers do to a less extent because they do not necessarily 
have an impact on the product market and therefore on welfare (unless there is a concern of 
portfolio effects, see section 1.2.1.5.4).  
More specifically, in vertical mergers, competitive effects depend on the structure of 
the downstream and upstream markets. For instance, when the upstream firm is a monopoly in 
the input market, the major concern to antitrust authorities is the possibility of foreclosure of 
downstream outsiders. The reason is that foreclosure may soften competition and facilitate   - 6 - 
raising prices. Other models of vertical mergers that involve markets with one manufacturer 
and intra-brand competition (competition among retailers that sell the same product or brand) 
predict  an  increase  in  consumer  surplus.  The  reason  is  that  the  elimination  of  double 
marginalization results in higher joint profits with lower final prices due to lower price-costs 
differentials.  In  vertical  mergers  in  which  there  is  inter-brand  competition  (several 
manufacturers selling through retailers), vertical integration might relax competition between 
manufacturers, and between retailers resulting in higher than competitive prices. That is, in 
markets with this structure, vertical mergers might favor collusive agreements and deter entry. 
For an extensive discussion of vertical mergers effects see chapter 6 of Motta (2004).  
On the other side, the major concern in horizontal mergers is the reduction of the 
number  of  competitors  because  of  the  general  thought  that  higher  concentration  implies 
higher  market power.  However,  it  has been  acknowledged  that,  in  differentiated products 
markets, tough competition may rule the market even when only two firms compete. The 
reason is that in these markets the degree of competition depends on the differentiation of the 
product rather than on the number of competitors. Then, the extent to which the merging firms 
will increase prices will depend on the degree of substitution between the merging products 
and the remaining ones. More specifically, the potential enhancement of market power due to 
a  horizontal  merger  is  analyzed  under  the  unilateral  effects  or  coordinated  effects  of  the 
merger. While coordinated effects refer to the scope of collusion, facilitated by the lower 
number  of  competitors,  unilateral  effects  refer  to  the  risk  that  the  merged  firm,  acting 
independently  of  any  remaining  rivals,  finds  profitable  to  raise  prices  after  the  merger. 
Oligopoly models of competition regarding at merger unilateral effects predict that whenever 
the merging products are substitutes and the market is composed of symmetric firms, prices in 
whichever mode of competition (in quantities with homogeneous  goods or in prices with 
differentiated markets) will increase.
4 In turn, the factors that would impede such adverse 
effect  on  prices  are  free  entry,  efficiency  gains  and  product  repositioning.  See  section 
1.2.1.5.1.  
Predictions  of  horizontal  merger  effects  within  models  involving  collusion  (or 
coordinated  effects)  are  more  complex  (see  1.2.1.5.2.)  because  they  include  not  only  the 
number of competitors and barriers to entry but also other considerations like the frequency of 
interaction among firms, the transparency of the market as well as the costs (a)symmetry 
among firms. The reason is that the key issue when assessing the profitability of collusion is 
                                                 
4 If the merging firms sell complementary products, economic theory predicts that post-merger prices will be 
reduced.   - 7 - 
to compare the loss of profits a firm will incur on if it deviates from collusive equilibrium. In 
general these models predict that, the smaller the number of competitors and the remaining 
mentioned  factors  facilitate  collusion.  More  dynamic  factors  such  as  a  growing  demand, 
demand  fluctuations  and  business  cycles,  growing  technologies  and  innovation  are  to  be 
considered  as  well  in  these  models.  While  a  growing  demand  facilitates  collusion,  the 
remaining factors hinder collusion. Other aspects to include in the analysis are asymmetries in 
capacity constraints, the presence of multi-market contacts and vertical differentiation. The 
three of them hinder collusion. Lastly, in these models the effect of horizontal differentiation 
on  consumers’  welfare  is  ambiguous.  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  unilateral  and 
coordinated effects of horizontal mergers see Ivaldi el al. (2003a and 2003b). 
Finally, conglomerate mergers are revised under the portfolio theory of merger effects. 
Welfare concerns arrive when the merging firms produce complementary products and  at 
least one of them already enjoys market power. The scope of enhancement of market power 
depends however on several other factors such as the possibility of bundling (provided rivals 
cannot  bundle),  an  increase  of  rivals’  costs,  etc.  For  an  extensive  discussion  about  the 
portfolio  effects  in  conglomerate  mergers  see  the  OECD  Best  Practices  Roundtable  of 
Portfolio Effects in Conglomerate Mergers (2002). 
Note that motives and effects of mergers are, first of all, different concepts (the former 
is ex-ante and the latter is ex-post). Second, they may not necessarily be in the same direction. 
For example, a merger searching for market power (motive) might not carry out higher prices 
(effect) because rivals firms might increase production in response to the decrease in the 
merged  firm’s  output,  ending  up,  with  lower  profits  (effect).  Also,  in  the  assessment  of 
merger motives one has to keep in mind that they are not exclusive to types of mergers. That 
is,  the  efficiency  gains  motive  can  be  a  driver  to  horizontal,  vertical  and  conglomerate 
mergers. The market for corporate control motive can be found in any type of merger too and 
so on. Important to mention as well is that motives in mergers are not exclusive to each other. 
Mergers in search of strengthening market power may also be motivated by efficiencies or 
synergy gains (to afterwards enhance market power). A merger motivated by the enhancement 
of  market  power  through  collusion  may  also  be  motivated  by  cost  savings  through 
rationalization  between  a  low  and  a  high  marginal  costs  firm.  A  disciplinary  merger 
undertaken through the market for corporate control might be motivated by financial cost 
savings and so on.  
 
   - 8 - 
1.2.   Merger Motives 
 
In  what  follows  I  classify  the  distinct  merger  motives  to  simplify  the  exposition. 
Recall that one motive is not exclusive to another. Section 1.2.1 lists the merger drivers that 
increase the value of the firm and section 1.2.2 those that increase the wealth of the manager. 
1.2.1.   Shareholder Gains 
By shareholders gains I refer to the increase in the market value of the firm due to the 
merger. Since the increase in the value of the firm directly benefits its owners (shareholders) 
it is said that shareholders gain. A firm may increase its market value by increasing its profits. 
Increasing  profits,  in  turn,  is  possible  by  decreasing  costs,  operating  more  efficiently, 
implementing  optimal  incentives  to  managers  or  enhancing  market  power.  These  merger 
rationales that produce gains to shareholders are exposed from section 1.2.1.1.1 to 1.2.1.7.2.  
 
1.2.1.1.  Efficiency gains
5 
Farrell  and  Shapiro
  (1990  and  2001)  distinguished  efficiency  gains  in  technical 
efficiencies and synergies. They defined technical efficiencies as those that could be obtained 
by other means than merging, in particular, by internal growth, joint ventures, specialization 
agreements,  licensing,  etc.  According  to  the  authors,  technical  efficiencies  correspond  to 
changes within the joint production capabilities of the merging parties. In the short term, they 
can be achieved by a reallocation of output across the merging units or scale economies if 
capital is mobile. In the longer run, they can be achieved by undertaking investment on a 
larger scale. On the other side, synergies are defined as efficiencies obtained through the close 
integration of the merging firms’ hard-to-trade assets, and are inherently merger-specific (see 
1.2.1.2) since such assets cannot be acquired otherwise than merging. The following three 
drivers that generate efficiency gains belong to the technical efficiencies definition. 
1.2.1.1.1.  Economies of scale  
A firm is said to have economies of scale when its average cost decreases as total 
output increases. More strictly, economies of scale arrive when the higher the production, the 
lower the marginal cost. In the short run, when physical capital is held fixed economies of 
scale make production less expensive. In the long run, they may result from the coordination 
                                                 
5 For an excellent and more detailed explanation and classification of efficiency gains from mergers see Roller, 
Stennek and Verboven (2006).   - 9 - 
of the merging firms’ investments in physical capital. So, short-run economies of scale may 
result from mergers because joining two firms allows getting rid of double fixed costs, i.e., 
costs that involve administrative tasks, customer service, billing, etc. The reason is that the 
larger firm will have after merger one single team in charge of these tasks instead of two. 
Short-run economies of scale can also be achieved by a reallocation of output across different 
units of operation of the merged firm. In the long-run, economies of scale result from the 
merger if the increase in output more than doubles the increase in all the inputs. This might 
arise when a larger and financially stronger firm invests in new technologies that substantially 
improve its production process and its research and development areas. See Tirole (1988). 
1.2.1.1.2.  Economies of scope 
Economies of scope are economies of scale generalized to multi-product firms or to 
firms related by a chain of supply. They are reached if the average cost of producing two 
products separately falls when the products are produced jointly. More technically, economies 
of scope exist when the higher the production of say, A the lower the marginal cost of B, 
provided A and B are related in one way or another within the same firm. See Motta (2004). 
1.2.1.1.3.  Economies of vertical integration 
Economies of vertical integration are revealed when the sum of the cost of separately 
owned stages of production falls when a single firm performs the two stages of production. 
These cost savings can be localized in the technical relationship between the two stages of 
production or in the market transactions costs (distribution costs). For instance, acquisitions of 
technical  support,  promotion,  training,  equipment  and  financing  are  often  seen  as  factors 
generating efficiency gains from vertical integration. Vertical integration can also be seen as 
an instrument to prevent opportunistic behavior among firms that have common investment 
contracts (one firm abandoning the investment project before it ends) that would be possible 
otherwise (if firms remain separated). In this context, positive effects on specific investments 
that  manufacturers  and  retailers  may  have  together  are  also  presented  as  an  argument  of 
efficiency gains in vertical mergers. Also, when an upstream firm finds it difficult to induce 
retailers’ behavior on its own interest, vertical integration can be an alternative to vertical 
restraints (i.e., quantity discounts, resale price maintenance, exclusivity contracts, etc.), by 
doing so, operation costs decrease and thus efficiencies of vertical integration are revealed. 
See Motta (2004). 
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1.2.1.2.  Synergy gains 
Synergies are efficiencies that can only be achieved by merging, that is, they are merger-
specific. Synergies are generally associated with a shift on the production possibilities of the 
merging parties that go beyond technical efficiencies (associated with changes within the joint 
production capabilities of the merging parties, i.e., economies of scale or scope). There is a 
general recognition that synergies involve either a process of learning, the close integration of 
specific  hard-to-trade  assets  or  a  transfer  of  know-how  among  the  merging  firms.  For 
example, when a small firm launches a new product but lacks of large scale sales, marketing 
and reputation, merging with a well established firm will most probably bring it gains that 
would have not been possible without merging. The diffusion of know-how, in turn, can be 
achieved when the merging firms exchange different R&D activities, patents, human skills, 
and organizational culture. Since these assets are in general non-tradable, firms can benefit 
from their combination uniquely by merging. 
1.2.1.2.1.  Diffusion of know-how 
If  the  merging  firms  have  different  technological  capabilities,  human  capital, 
organizational  cultures,  patents,  or  simply  know-how  and  it  turns  out  that  they  are 
complementary to each other; then, by putting them together, they will most probably achieve 
a  technological  progress.  Such  a  technological  progress  can  take  the  form  of  product  or 
process innovation. See Roller, Stennek and Verboven (2006). 
1.2.1.2.2.  R&D 
As well as know-how, R&D is a very powerful non-tradable asset that combined in 
better ways (by merging with a complement) may allow for a technological progress and an 
increase  in  the  firms’  joint  production  possibilities.  According  to  Roller,  Stennek  and 
Verboven  (2006),  an  acquiring  firm  may  see  a  high  R&D  target  as  a  faster  mean  of 
investment on R&D than internally expending on it. Indeed, often merging firms claim that by 
integrating their R&Ds they will faster introduce new or better quality products and innovate 
in cost reducing processes. 
 
1.2.1.3.  Cost savings 
Cost savings is a very general concept that may be attained in many distinct ways. 
What is important for the analysis of merger motives is to identify the type of cost saving, i.e., 
if it consists on a reduction of average or marginal costs of production, fixed costs or financial   - 11 - 
costs. Fixed costs are those that do not vary with production but that are necessary to produce. 
They  include  for  instance  administrative  support,  public  relationships,  maintenance  of 
property plant and equipment, salaries, advertising, etc. Average costs vary with production, 
by definition they are total costs divided by total production. More often employed in the 
economic literature is the concept of marginal costs which stands for the increase in costs with 
one extra unit of production. Finally, by financial costs I refer to those costs that only affect 
the distribution of costs within the firm’s administration but not the cost of production. Thus, 
whereas financial costs savings do not imply a saving of productive resources in the economy, 
average  or  marginal  costs  savings  in  the  form  of  economies  of  scale,  scope  and  vertical 
integration  do.  Acquiring  a  high  R&D  target  or  a  target  with  patents  instead  of  directly 
expending on it, is another way of saving costs. Transferring more efficient technology from 
one firm to another clearly decreases total costs. The elimination of the duplication of fixed 
costs when merging will, of course, decrease costs as well. Other examples of cost savings 
that have been proposed as merger motives are: 
1.2.1.3.1.  Rationalization 
Rationalization  consists  on  a  more  optimal  reallocation  of  production  across  the 
different lines of production of the merging firms. That is, shifting production from a plant 
with  higher  marginal  costs  to  another  with  lower  marginal  costs,  without  necessarily 
increasing the joint technological capabilities, is a mean to save costs.  
1.2.1.3.2.  Purchasing power 
Cost savings may arrive when firms at the downstream level of production merge to 
increase their bargaining power towards their providers of inputs (firms at the upstream level 
of production). That is, by increasing its size, a downstream firm may also increase its buyer 
power and obtain quantity discounts or just better prices from their upstream suppliers. This 
practice would clearly imply a cost saving for the new merged entity.  
1.2.1.3.3.  Creating internal capital markets 
This hypothesis states that if external capital markets (stocks, securities or banks) are 
not  sufficiently  efficient  to  create  value,  then by  building  up  an  M-form  larger  firm  that 
creates an internal capital market, value will be generated. See Tirole (1988). The M-form 
firm refers to a multidivisional structure of the firm. That is, to a firm is composed of several 
product lines or geographic areas called divisions. These divisions are owned altogether by a 
single  corporation  but  are  decentralized  and  their  operational  decisions  are  independent   - 12 - 
among them. However, there is a single authority (headquarters) that audits and allocates 
resources among the competing (or complementary) separated divisions. Thus, it is thought 
that by merging divisions to create the M-form firm a more efficient allocation of capital 
among  divisions  will  save  the  higher  costs  of  operation  incurred  when  divisions  remain 
separately  owned.  The  necessary  condition  to generate  additional  value  here  is  to  have  a 
superior entity that controls the reallocation of resources among the firms (the divisions). The 
reason is that, in internal capital markets, the residual control rights of managers increase 
headquarters’ monitoring incentives and improve capital allocation (relative to the external 
capital ones). In sum, the alleged motive in these mergers is to create a new larger firm that 
combines the merging firms’ (divisions) capital and reallocates it in a more efficient way to 
generate costs savings and thus larger profits.  
 
1.2.1.4.  Financial cost savings 
Too high financial costs may be a motive to merger as well. According to Roller, 
Stennek  and  Verboven  (2006),  financial  costs  savings  do  not  generate  real  cost  savings 
(savings  in  productions  costs);  instead,  they  involve  redistributive  cost  savings.  That  is, 
financial costs do not necessarily imply a value increase in the merging entity; they only 
reflect a redistribution of wealth from shareholders to debtholders. Among other ways they 
can be attained by saving on: 
1.2.1.4.1.  Taxes 
Mergers before the 1980s were strongly motivated by tax advantages. The reason is 
that at the time when an acquisition premium was paid above the values at which a company’s 
depreciable assets were recorded in tax accounts, the acquired assets could benefit of higher 
depreciation charges, protecting the acquirer from tax liabilities. Until reforms were passed, 
acquiring companies making such acquisitions could normally escape immediate capital gains 
taxation. Such tax advantages had an important role in many merger decisions, but not critical 
enough to determine whether merger would or would not occur. Nowadays there is a tax rule 
that  differentiates  the  tax  liability  according  to  the  accounting  method  by  which  the 
acquisition is registered (purchase of assets or pooling of interest).  
1.2.1.4.2.  Interest rates 
Often  small  firms  cannot  borrow  at  competitive  interest  rates  due  to  liquidity 
constraints  or  to  asymmetric  information  in  the  external  capital  market.  Since  a  large   - 13 - 
corporation has better access to the outside capital market that a small one, the merger is said 
to be motivated by the possibility of borrowing more cheaply than separate units.  
1.2.1.4.3.  Diversification 
The  idea  that  diversification  may  be  a  motive  to  merge  is  related  to  the  modern 
portfolio theory. This theory states that the market value of a firm can be increased if it incurs 
in optimal risk by investing in many uncorrelated instruments. This merger motive is different 
from the spreading portfolio motive that allows enhancing market power and that is based on 
the so-called portfolio theory exposed in 1.2.1.5.4. The common feature between them is that 
they  occur  in  conglomerate  mergers  and  acquisitions.  Here,  the  idea  is  that  managers 
assemble  a  portfolio  composed  of  selected  portfolios  based  on  their  overall  risk-return 
performance  rather  than  portfolios  with  securities  that  have  individual  high  risk-return 
performance.
6  This  is  a  financial  strategy  that  may  reduce  the  risk  of  bankruptcy  too. 
Sometimes diversification may be chosen with the purpose of higher managerial rents (see 
1.2.2.4). 
 
1.2.1.5.  Enhancement or strengthen of market power 
Market power is defined as the ability of a firm or group of firms to raise prices above 
the level that would prevail under competitive conditions. The ability to exclude competitors 
is also seen as a result of excessive market power. The scope of enhancement of market power 
is  associated  with  industry  concentration,  product  differentiation,  entry  barriers  and  cost 
advantages. The market power merger motive in horizontal mergers is the most controversial 
one. However, as exposed in the following paragraphs, market power  is not exclusive to 
horizontal mergers. 
1.2.1.5.1.  Through unilateral effects 
Unilateral effects arrive in horizontal mergers and are defined as the threat that the 
merged firm, acting independently of any remaining rivals (that is without colluding), finds 
profitable  to  raise  its prices  after  the  merger.  The  assessment  of  unilateral  effects  differs 
depending on the mode of competition assumed. For example, Farrell and Shapiro (1990), 
within a framework of competition in quantities, in which firms produce homogeneous goods 
and  have  equal  constant  marginal  costs,  find  that  the  effect  of  a  horizontal  merger  is  an 
                                                 
6 Simpler than that: managers chose portfolios by comparing the stock relative performance with a general index 
in the market rather than by its stand alone performance.   - 14 - 
increase in prices. Even though rivals typically increase output when the merging firms limit 
their production levels, horizontal mergers under quantity competition result in higher prices 
unless  they  generate  economies  of  scale  or  synergies.  The  authors  also  show  that  the 
necessary economies of scale or synergies to lower prices are greater the larger the merging 
firms’ market shares are and the more inelastic the market demand is. Some other oligopoly 
models like the one of Perry and Porter (1985) show that mergers between asymmetric (in 
distribution of capital) firms, whose driver is to create internal capital markets, also reduce the 
degree of competition, increase prices, and reduce therefore consumer surplus. In the context 
of  price  competition  with  differentiated  products,  the  pioneer  analysis  of  Deneckere  and 
Davidson (1985) shows that mergers in these markets lead to price increases of all firms 
(merging and non-merging) unless strong synergies are a consequence of the merger. The 
main  element  driving  the  results  of  this  model  is precisely product  differentiation.  When 
products  are  differentiated  they  are  not  perfect  substitutes  and  consumers  may  not  easily 
switch to a non-perfect substitute product when facing a price increase. Then, merging firms 
producing substitute products will benefit from raising prices to some degree, because they 
will recapture some of the customers who switch in favor of what previously was a competing 
product. Besides merger efficiencies other factors that would deter the exercise of market 
power in these models are free entry and buyer power. The reason is that when entering a 
market is sufficiently easy a post-merger price increase would only be transitory since new 
firms will supply at these more attractive prices which will prevent the increase in prices. On 
the other side, strong buyers (downstream firms for instance) can constraint upstream market 
power by threatening to switch orders from one seller to another or by threatening to start 
upstream production itself. For an extensive discussion of unilateral effect models see Ivaldi 
et al. (2003b) and Motta (2004, pp. 243-265). 
1.2.1.5.2.  Through coordinated effects (or collusion) 
Coordinated effects also arrive in horizontal mergers, they refer to the case when the 
merger changes the mode of competition to a more tacit or explicit collusive behavior that 
facilitates the increase in prices. Recent propositions of collusive behavior predict that there is 
a positive relationship between market concentration and the probability of collusion. The 
reason is that, the smaller the number of competitors, the easier is to detect deviations from 
collusion  and  also  the  smaller  the  profit  from  deviating.  However,  if  firms  are  more 
asymmetric after the merger, reducing the number of firms in the market might not be enough 
to increase the scope for collusion. The reason is that higher firms’ asymmetries make more   - 15 - 
difficult to sustain collusion because it is harder to coordinate and to discipline one another 
from deviations. Another feature that facilitates collusion is the elimination of a maverick 
either by horizontal merger of by vertical integration. A maverick is often considered as a new 
entrant that is not interested in pursuing collusion and behaves competitively or as a small 
firm with high innovation and patents assets. The key issue with the maverick is that it is a 
firm that has substantial competitive advantages with respect to its rivals. Then, by acquiring 
the maverick the possibility of a more collusive pricing is raised. Other models of vertical 
mergers  predict  that  when  there  is  inter-brand  competition  (several  manufacturers  selling 
through retailers), vertical integration might relax competition between manufacturers and 
between retailers allowing them to set higher prices. That is, in markets with this structure 
vertical  mergers  might  favor  collusive  agreements  and  deter  entry.  For  an  extensive 
discussion of models of collusion see Ivaldi et al. (2003a). 
1.2.1.5.3.  To raise entry barriers 
Post-merger higher entry barriers may facilitate the enhancement of market power. For 
instance, collusion cannot be sustained in the absence of entry barriers and it is more difficult 
to sustain the lower the entry barriers because deviating form collusive equilibrium is less 
costly. As well, merger unilateral effects on prices are less likely to occur if barriers to entry 
are low since the merging firm faces the likelihood of tougher competition. Then, raising 
entry barriers is a mean to enhance market power. Such entry barriers may be attained by 
merging  if  for  example  the  merger  unifies  two  potentially  competing  technologies  or 
facilitates tying strategies. 
1.2.1.5.4.  To spread portfolio  
This  motive  is  analyzed  under  the  so-called  portfolio  theory  of  merger  effects  or 
simply portfolio effects by the European competition authority. According to Motta (2004), it 
concerns mergers between firms that produce goods in distinct product markets but that are 
somehow related or complementary, that is, it concerns conglomerate mergers. This portfolio 
theory states that a merged firm is able to gain market power because its buyers will prefer to 
be supplied of different inputs by the same firm rather that by different firms. It also states 
that  the  merger  may  acquire  higher  bargaining  power  towards  its  buyers  and  even  force 
competitors  to  exit  the  market.  The  merging  to  spread  portfolio  motive  also  introduces 
efficiencies in its analysis. A demand efficiency occurs when buyers buy tied products and 
that are complements that are offered at lower prices by the merged firm than by independent   - 16 - 
firms. A cost efficiency occurs because offering a full range of products is less costly than 
offering them separately and thus firms save in operation costs by merging. 
1.2.1.5.5.  To obtain multimarket contact 
The hypothesis of the multimarket contact –defined as the meeting of firms in more 
than one market- applies to conglomerate mergers as well.
7 For an extense review of this 
motive in mergers see Scott (2005). This hypothesis states that a merger between diversified 
sellers can create market power in the individual market in which sellers compete. That is, the 
market power of a seller in a particular market can be increased through its contacts in other 
markets. To illustrate this, think about firms A and B competing in market 1, and firms C and 
D competing in market 2. If firms A and C merge as well as B and D, I end up with two firms 
AC and BD that compete in both markets 1 and 2 and that have a multimarket contact. The 
multimarket contact model shows that the merger will facilitate the sustainability of collusive 
prices in both markets 1 and 2, which would have not been possible without the multimarket 
contact (facilitated by the merger).
8 The model also states that if collusion already existed in 
market  1  but  not  in  market  2,  with  the  multimarket  contact  post-merger  collusion  is 
sustainable  in both  markets.  The  multimarket  contact  hypothesis  also  introduces potential 
demand and supply efficiencies in the analysis. On the cost side, it states that a conglomerate 
merger with multimarket contact may generate economies of scale and scope. On the demand 
side, efficiencies are based on the conjecture that buyers of multiple products may reduce 
transaction costs if they buy from sellers offering several product lines at the time. This last 
argument is similar to the demand efficiency considered in the spreading portfolio motive. 
 
1.2.1.6.  Preemptive and defensive 
Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) propose a merger rational that they call the preemptive 
(or defensive) motive. They develop a model that shows that if being and insider is better that 
being and outsider, firms will acquire to prevent the target being acquired by a competitor. 
The reason is that the merged firm will be a more efficient firm (provided cost efficiencies) 
                                                 
7Although generally antitrust enforcement does consider cases of conglomerate mergers, Scott (2005) insists in 
that theory and evidence show that multimarket contacts are a source of market power. The author affirms 
finding evidence that supports the multimarket contact hypothesis because in his estimations profits for lines of 
business in concentrated industries are significantly higher when multimarket contacts are high. Further evidence 
of multimarket contacts allowing for collusion is found in Evans and Kessides (1994) who studied the airlines 
market and in Parker and Roller (1997) who studied the US mobile telephone market. 
8 This result holds only when there are asymmetries in the market, that is, when the market shares of firm A and 
B (and of C and D) in market 1 differ between each other as well as their shares in market 2.    - 17 - 
and will become a more difficult competitor. This will affect the outsider, so preventing being 
an outsider, firms preempt the merger by anticipating the takeover. Other motives in mergers 
have been interpreted as defensive in the economic literature. The most common of these is 
the elimination of a significant competitor (a maverick for instance). Such defensive mergers 
may be seeking for market power enhancement, or may simply be responding to tougher price 
competition originated from exogenous factors. Defensive mergers have also been proposed 
as  a  result  of  an  endogenous  market  response  to  exogenous  market  shocks  such  as  new 
technological opportunities that increase the potential for innovation.  
 
1.2.1.7.  Disciplinary takeovers 
These takeovers are said to play an instrument for ensuring that managers’ actions do 
not deviate too far from those that would maximize shareholders value. They are thus inspired 
on the principal-agent theory and proposed as discipline devices from owners (principals) to 
managers (agents). Motives that pursue managerial gains (exposed in 1.2.2) are also founded 
in this theory. Their difference is based on that the ones exposed here seek to increase the 
firm’s value whereas those in 1.2.2 are managers’ strategies seeking to increase their own 
wealth (at the expense of the firm’s value). 
1.2.1.7.1.  Market for corporate control 
The market for corporate control (market for targets) motive has been first proposed 
by  Manne  (1965).  The  hypothesis  states  that  a  firm  is  undervalued  due  to  inefficient 
management and that any bidder can detect this, acquire that firm and replace the manager. 
Thus, such a market operates efficiently in eliminating managers who either pursue goals that 
do not go into the shareholders’ interests, or are simply incompetent. If the bidder who obtains 
the target replaces the pre-merger manager with a better one, the target will increase its value 
(if the manager is worse though it will decrease its value). Some authors have argued that the 
mere threat of a market for corporate control may serve as a disciplining mechanism to the 
targets’ managers.
9 
1.2.1.7.2.  Free-cash flow 
The  excess  of  free-cash  flows  is  often  considered  as  a  result  of  management 
inefficiency.  Indeed, it  has been stated that companies that hold high  free-cash flows  are 
frequent targets in hostile takeovers. On the acquirer side, managers believe in the superior 
                                                 
9 This hypothesis has been tested empirically in event studies. I will discuss this in section 1.3.1.   - 18 - 
quality of their investment decisions, relative to those of the shareholders. They prefer to re-
invest corporate earnings even when this is not in the interest of the latter. One way of doing 
so, is by acquiring a target with excess free-cash flow. Jensen (1986) affirms that one way to 
solve for this agency problem is imposing to acquiring managers to finance the acquisition by 
debt. Using debt would discipline the acquiring firm’s manager by reducing his post-merger 
discretion in the use of the free-cash flow.  
 
Among the above reviewed merger motives the ones that might alter welfare through 
changes in products’ prices, quantities or innovation are: the efficiency and synergy gains, 
costs savings, market power, preemtion and better management. The remaining one, financial 
costs  savings  does  not,  in  principle,  imply  any  effect  on  welfare.  The  following  merger 
motives do not offer any prediction of effects on the product market and thus on welfare. Still, 
they are often an issue in empirical (financial) studies because they propose an alternative to 
understand the merger paradox, namely, mergers failing.  
 
1.2.2.  Managerial Gains 
The following proposals of merger motives originate on the theory of the internal 
inefficiency of the firm, the so-called X-inefficiency first analyzed by Leibenstein (1966). This 
theory  highlights  that  there  is  a  difference  between  the  efficient  behavior  of  firms,  as 
predicted by economic theory, and what it is observed in practice. The reason is that, in the 
real  world,  firms  are  complex  organizations  in  which  there  is  a  separation  between 
shareholders (ownership) and managers (control). In these organizations, the decisions that 
affect  the  overall  level  of  efficiency  of  the  firm are  taken by  managers  who  might  have 
objectives other than firm’s value maximization. This is in turn related to the principal-agent 
theory that emphasizes the conflicts between shareholders and managers whenever there is 
incomplete  and  asymmetric  information  between  them  (the  manager  is  usually  better 
informed  about  his  plans).  These  conflicts  arise  since  shareholders  (principal)  seek  to 
maximize firm’s value and managers (agents) seek to maximize their wage (or their ego). 
That is the reason why these merger drivers are also known as the agency motive. In the 
overall,  these  motives  state  that  the  manager  is  searching  for  gains  at  the  expense  of 
shareholders gains.   - 19 - 
1.2.2.1.  Empire building 
Also called the managerial discretion motive, it states that managers’ objective is to 
increase the size of the organization they want to lead. Their goal is to grow and the fastest 
way to do it is by acquiring. The reason might be that their compensation is directly related to 
the size of the company they manage. This hypothesis has first been formulated by Mueller 
(1969). 
1.2.2.2.  Hubris 
This  merger  driver  was  first  proposed  by  Roll  (1986).  The  hypothesis  states  that 
managers incorrectly believe to be better able to manage other companies. That is, they are 
overconfident in their managerial abilities and end up overpaying for a target which makes the 
acquiring firm to lose. In fact, it has been argued that the hubris consequence (acquiring firm 
losing from the deal) is equivalent to the winner’s curse in common value auctions, namely, 
bidders  overpay  for  the  auctioned  item.  Here,  the  highest bidder  has  the  highest positive 
valuation  error  (reflecting  his  overconfidence)  and  wins  the  target.  The  result  is  that 
shareholders of the acquiring firm lose from the deal because the market reacts to the mistake 
of the acquiring firm’s manager. 
1.2.2.3.  Risk spreading or diversification 
Sometimes  the  overall  investment  strategy  of  the  manager  to  construct  an  optimal 
portfolio includes mergers and acquisitions. According to the portfolio theory this is indeed a 
mean, to diversify risk (by spreading a selected portfolio) and to maximize expected returns. 
However,  sometimes  the  manager  seeks  for  a  personal  portfolio  rather  that  an  optimal 
portfolio for the firm. Since he has the power to select the portfolio, personal diversification 
might be his goal. 
 
As  mentioned  above,  competition  authorities  generally  consider  overall  economic 
welfare as consumer surplus rather than total surplus and therefore not all the above merger 
drivers are necessarily relevant for them. For purposes of merger enforcement, the issue that 
matters is the effect on welfare and not whether the transaction will generate gains to the firm 
or  to  the  manager  of  the  firm.  For  instance,  mergers  (of  either  conglomerate,  vertical  or 
horizontal type) motivated by managerial gains are not worth analyzed by antitrust authorities 
as they only involve a redistribution of gains among shareholders and managers. Nor are 
mergers driven by hubris, here, the effects are a transfer of wealth from acquirers to targets.   - 20 - 
Neither are mergers driven by the empire building motive which effect is a transfer of wealth 
from  shareholders  to  managers.  The  same  reasoning  applies  for  financial  costs  reducing 
mergers, that is, they do not necessarily affect the product market where the merger takes 
place and thus welfare.  
In fact, competition authorities do concentrate the assessment of merger effects on the 
scope of enhanced market power resulted from a horizontal or vertical (to a less extend) 
merger.
10 The reason is that from all these hypotheses of merger motives only the market 
power one (through the unilateral or coordinated effects) offers a clear potential effect on 
consumer  surplus.  Indeed,  the  predictions  of  these  models  have  served  as  a  base  to 
competition authorities in designing merger policy. For example, the European Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines (HMG) stipulate that, if coordinated effects are the concern, factors that 
facilitate post merger collusion are to be taken into account in the assessment of the merger. 
These  factors  among  others  include:  market  concentration,  entry  barriers,  multimarket 
contacts, regularity of market interactions, transparency of the market (information exchange), 
and capacity constraints. On the other side, if unilateral effects are the concern, the analysis 
requires a quantitative projection of the (short-term) price change as a result of the merger. 
Moreover,  merger-specific  efficiencies  are  to  be  taken  into  account  to  make  a  trade-off 
between the efficiency gains and the higher market power. That is, it is necessary to predict 
whether efficiency gains will outweigh the negative impact of the increased market power. 
This is difficult but feasible by making use of the simulation technique described in 3.2. 
Indeed, antitrust enforcement has introduced the role of merger synergies to clear a merger 
that might be otherwise considered anticompetitive. The US merger regulation has included 
the  efficiency  defence  in  merger  analysis  since  1997  and  the  EC  merger  regulation  has 
introduced in its 2004 reform. They recognize, as oligopoly theory predicts, that efficiencies 
generated through merger can enhance the merged firms’ ability and incentive to compete, 
which may result in lower prices, improved quality and innovation (new products). Both such 
legislations  impose  however  some  conditions  to  accept  the  efficiency  defence  clause  in 
mergers: efficiencies must be merger-specific, verifiable, and must be sufficiently large to 
prevent  the  merger  from being  anticompetitive.  Then,  necessarily  the  following  questions 
emerge: what efficiencies are merger-specific? How to verify them? How to know if they will 
overwhelm enhanced market power?  
                                                 
10Vertical mergers are generally considered as welfare enhancing. The reason is that economic theory suggest 
that by vertical integration, the upstream and the downstream firm will avoid double marginalization and will 
then save costs. However, as it has been exposed in 2.1.1.3, vertical integration may have adverse effects on 
welfare because it may result either in foreclosure or on easier conditions to sustain collusion.   - 21 - 
As  discussed  above,  Farrell  and  Shapiro  (2001)  explore  which  efficiencies  should 
qualify as being merger specific. They proposed to distinguish between efficiencies that could 
be achieved by other means than a merger from those that can only be achieved through this 
particular form of corporate reorganization. The authors refer to technical efficiencies as those 
gains that could be obtained otherwise; and synergies as efficiencies that can only be achieved 
by  merging,  i.e.,  that  are  merger-specific.  It  is  well  known  however  that  including  the 
efficiency  defence  in  case  studies  is  not  an  easy  task  because  it  is  costly  and  lengthy. 
Furthermore, the requirement of the merger guidelines that efficiencies arising from a merger 
need to be verifiable is often interpreted as quantifiable. Roller, Stennek and Verboven (2006) 
as well as Motis, Neven and Seabright (2006),
11 recommend to leave in the responsibility of 
the firms that claim searching for efficiencies and merger-specific gains, the burden of such a 
proof. The  former  group of authors proposes also a checklist of relevant dimensions that 
should be considered when assessing the role of efficiencies in mergers. For example, the 
authors emphasize that efficiencies in the form of cost savings that involve social efficiencies 
and not only redistributive gains are the ones to be included in a welfare analysis. Then, only 
rationalization  (1.2.1.3.1)  should  be  considered  as  a  social  gain,  while  all  the  rest  in  the 
category  of  cost  savings  should  not  (since  they  only  involve  a  transfer  of  wealth).  Cost 
savings involving the elimination of duplicated fixed costs should not be considered either 
because they do not imply an effect on product prices. Further recommendations are to focus 
uniquely on the relevant market rather than on other markets where multiproduct merging 
firms may operate, and to regard at firm level of efficiencies and not at the industry level 
efficiencies. Finally, another important issue to have in mind is that even if merging firms 
reach  efficiencies  post  merger,  this  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  such  efficiencies  will 
benefit  consumers  with  lower  market prices.  According  to  Roller,  Stennek  and  Verboven 
(2006), for efficiencies to ensure price reductions after mergers it must be that they are driven 
by long-run economies of scale involving the flexibility of physical capital, product-specific 
economies of scale and synergies materialized in technological progress, in turn achieved by 
transfers of know-how or by increased incentives in R&D. 
 
All the previous arguments are supported by the theories of industrial organization or 
corporate  governance,  a  natural  following  question would be:  what  have  the  literature  of 
industrial economics and/or finance done to investigate for merger motives, merger gains and 
                                                 
11 Both studies are documented in Efficiencies in Merger Control (2006).   - 22 - 
merger effects? There are many empirical studies that have investigated these features. I will 
summarize their methodology and general results in the following subsections.  
 
1.3.  Empirical Evidence: Merger Gains, Motives and Effects  
 
To  our  knowledge,  empirical  studies  have  not,  until  now,  tested  for  all  the  above 
mentioned hypotheses of merger motives. The main reason is the difficulty to disentangle the 
motive from the observation of the merging (and non-merging) firms’ gains. The empirical 
methodologies employed in the assessment of merger gains, motives and effects I expose in 
this  section  perform  either  a  reduced-form  analysis  or,  a  structural-form  analysis.  The 
empirical reduced-form analysis establishes an indirect, incomplete or informal relationship 
between  the  observed  data  and  the  economic  model.  For  example,  event-studies  and 
accounting-studies “guess” the economic model from the estimated gains. To this category 
also belongs the previously largely employed SCP (structure conduct performance) technique 
that  due  statistical  its  pitfalls  and  weak  relation  with  new  industrial  organization  models 
ceased being reliable in contemporary merger  empirical analysis.
12 Studies employing the 
reduced-form methodology analyze several mergers and acquisitions occurring in different 
periods and industries at the time, that is, their analysis is in a group-of-mergers basis. In 
contrast, the empirical structural-form technique drives the analysis through and economic 
model  which  in  turn  serves  to  interpret  the  estimated  data.  Studies  employing  this 
methodology  do  so  in  a  case-by-case,  their  objective  is  to  predict  the  merger  effects  as 
responses to changes of relevant factors in the specific industry the merger is taking place (for 
example, the change of number of firms in the industry and/or the potential merger-specific 
gains). In what follows I briefly summarize these different empirical methodologies and their 
overall evidence. 
 
                                                 
12 This methodology is based on the idea that market structure (i.e., number of competitors) determines market 
conduct (i.e., competition or collusion) and hence generates market performance (productivity or profitability).  
Its strongest pitfall is the statement of a systematic causality of concentration on market power. That is, the SCP 
hypothesis predicts that market prices would be higher the greater the level of concentration. Since nowadays it 
is well acknowledged that in the context of product differentiation, an industry with just two competitors can be 
highly competitive, and that even a market with a monopolist can achieve the competitive equilibrium if the 
market is open to new entrants because costless entry would keep prices low (these reflections are based on 
theories of unilateral effects). The second critic is related to methodological problems. For example (to cite the 
perhaps most important statistical pitfall of the technique) the fact that in reality performance has an effect on 
structure (and not only structure on performance) implies a serious endogeneity problem on the SCP regression.   - 23 - 
1.3.1.  Event studies 
Event studies rely on the assumption that stock prices reflect the present value of the 
expected gains created by the merging firms. Assumption sustained in turn by the efficiency 
of the stock markets. By computing changes in the stock prices of the merging firms with 
respect to a market portfolio or an industry index, that is, by estimating the market model or 
the CAPM, they investigate whether the announcement of the merger causes the stock returns 
of the bidder and target to perform differently. The merger gains are said to be the return that 
is  observed  in  excess  of  what  it  would  have  been  if  no  merger  announcement  had  been 
made.
13  Most  of  these  event  studies  find  that  while  acquired  firms  gain  from  the  deal, 
acquirers  at  best  do  not  lose.  Joint  gains  are  found  mostly  positive  but  not  always 
significant.
14 In trying to identify the motive to merger, Mueller and Sirower (1998) use the 
distribution of the merging firms’ abnormal returns and test for: the market for corporate 
control, synergy, managerial discretion and hubris motives in mergers.  They  interpret the 
substantial loses of bidders, at the time the acquisition is announced, as evidence supporting 
the managerial discretion and hubris rationales and to a less extent to the market for corporate 
control (since these hypotheses predict decreases in the value of the acquiring firm). Some of 
these studies test for the market power and the efficiency hypotheses of merger by comparing 
targets’ and bidders’ gains as well as those of their rivals.
15 If insiders and outsiders register 
positive gains, market power is said to be the effect of the merger, if only insiders register 
positive gains while outsiders lose, then efficiency is said to be the effect of the merger. On 
the other hand, if merging firms obtain negative abnormal returns while outsiders gain, event 
studies  evoke  the  managerial  hypotheses  of  empire-building  or  hubris.  Finally,  when  all 
players register negative abnormal returns, event studies fall back on the theory of preemptive 
mergers. However, this technique faces some pitfalls in inferring merger gains. The most 
important of them is that event studies are not able to disentangle any gains originated from 
increased market power or from efficiencies since simply because there is not an underlying 
                                                 
13 More specifically, the market model, 
it i mt it R e α β = + + , is first calculated for a period prior to the merger 
announcement called the “estimation window”, where  it R  are the actual returns to firm i at time t,  mt R  are the 
actual returns to a market portfolio for firm i at time t. Second, a period after announcement called the “event 
window” is selected to compute the abnormal returns. These lasts are obtained by subtracting the predicted 
return to the actual return, that is, by computing:  ˆ ˆ ( )
it it i mt AR R α β = + − . Finally, merger gains are obtained by 
summing up the abnormal returns over the length of the event window; they are called the cumulative abnormal 
returns.  
14 For reviews of event studies see Jensen and Ruback (1983), Tichy (2002), Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford 
(2001), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988). 
15 See Stillman (1983), Eckbo (1983), Banerjee and Eckard (1998).   - 24 - 
structural model from which one could identify the parameters of the reduced form employed 
to infer about merger gains. Moreover, determining if the merging firms generate any gains 
by computing outsiders’ reaction to the merger is incomplete. The reason is that only insiders 
have sufficient information about the generation of new value for the merged entity and this is 
not necessarily revealed at the merger announcement date. This might be why event studies 
generally conclude that merging is not a profitable activity for the acquiring firm.  
1.3.2.  Accounting studies 
These  studies  analyze  merger  performance  by  measuring  and  comparing  the 
accounting profits of the merging parties before and after their integration with those of a 
control group. These studies are less homogeneous between them than event studies because 
different measures of profitability are adopted, for example cash flows, gross profits, profits 
net of interest and taxes, profit ratios (returns on equity, on total assets, or on sales). Different 
alternatives are also used to control for external shocks, i.e., comparing the merging firms 
with their base industry or with matching firms (firms similar to the merged ones in industry 
and  size).  The  variation  in  the  employment  of  this  methodology  seems  higher  than  the 
variance of general results. Indeed, the findings of these studies do not differ very much from 
those of event studies. In most cases post-merger profits of the merging firms are weaker than 
the ones of the merging-control group.
16 With this methodology, the hypotheses of market 
power  and  efficiency  have  been  tested  as  well.  For  instance,  Gugler  et  al.  (2003)  use 
profitability and sales as their measure of performance. They conjecture that if profits and 
sales increase, efficiency was the driver of the merger, while if profits increase and sales 
decrease market power was the driver of the merger. They split their sample in large and 
small firms. For large firms they  find that, five  years after the acquisition, 43 percent of 
merged firms reveal a merger fail (a loss in profit). Efficiency is found to be the motive in 29 
percent of the sample and market power in 28 percent of the sample. For the small firms 
sample they found that 35 percent of the firms revealed the efficiency motive and 20 percent 
the market power motive. 
 
The two previous approaches measure the performance of the merging firms relative 
to  a  benchmark  of  expected  performance  and  relative  to  their  close  neighbors  and 
competitors. They employ large datasets in the form of cross-section or panel (cross section 
                                                 
16 See Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), Mueller (1980a and 1980b) among 
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with time series) datasets. This data is relatively easy to collect since it is generally available 
in public databases (in universities or research centers), DataStream would be an example.
17 
However,  given  that  they  rely  on  a  reduced  form  analysis  two  main  drawbacks  are 
encountered. The first one has to be with economic theory because the question remains in 
identifying the relationships within insiders’ returns and between outsiders’/ insiders’ returns. 
The second one is more a statistical issue and has to be with the identification of such gains.  
1.3.3.  Case-by-case studies with/out simulation 
These studies are based on oligopoly models of competition and employed structural 
econometrics to predict the result of the merger on prices. To our knowledge these studies are 
mostly performed for horizontal merger cases and to a much less extend to either vertical or 
conglomerate  mergers.  This  might  be  because  it  is  generally  thought  that  vertical  and 
conglomerate mergers are much less likely to harm competition or simply because they are 
much more data demanding.
18 These studies look at the effect of the merger on prices since 
they rely on unilateral effects models and take gains as granted (see section 1.2.1.5). This is 
because in unilateral effects models an increase in price is equivalent to an increase in profit. 
Thus, the actual question here is not if mergers gain, but instead, how large the price increase 
will be. This serves to determine if such a merger will enhance or increase significant market 
power.  The  general  procedure  is  briefly  described  as  follows.  In  a  first  step,  structural 
econometric tools are employed to estimate the supply and demand side of the merger and 
therefore obtain the pre merger equilibrium prices. In a second step, simulation is employed to 
predict the post merger equilibrium prices taking into account potential efficiencies (modeled 
as decreases in constant marginal costs of the new merging entity). In the third and final step, 
pre and post merger prices are compared and the corresponding perceptual change obtained. 
The common feature of these case studies is the assumed mode of competition. It is generally 
modeled as Bertrand competition, that is, in a differentiated products market context where 
firms choose their prices to maximize their own profit assuming that their competitors are 
acting  in  similar  way.
19  Most  of  the  variation  in  these  competition  models  relies  on  the 
                                                 
17 By “easy” I mean at no additional monetary cost, of course it demands considerable time and effort. 
18However recent theories of foreclosure predict that vertical mergers can either eliminate horizontal competition 
or  allow  a  monopolist  to  preserve  its  market  power  against  downstream  buyers.  Indeed,  under  certain 
circumstances  a  vertically  integrated  firm  is  more  able  to  exploit  market  power  that  if  it  were  vertically 
separated.  Some  empirical  studies  have  started  to  include  the  vertical  aspect  in  horizontal  mergers,  see  for 
example Bonnet, Dubois and Simioni (2006). Conglomerate mergers motivated by the purchasing power or by 
the spread of portfolio drivers may also facilitate the exercise of market power. 
19 If coordinates effects is carrying out in the analysis, firms are assumed to set their prices by maximizing their 
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demand side specification, which in turn, plays a crucial role on the effects in prices. For 
instance  Crooke  et  al.  (1999)  have  shown  that  the  predicted  price  increase  is  greatest  if 
demand is of the constant elasticity form (log-linear), followed by the AIDS form, followed in 
turn by the logit demand and lastly by the linear demand.
20 The difference relies of course in 
the curvature of each demand system. This methodology requires data about product prices, 
market  shares,  size  of  the  market  and  product  characteristics  to  finally  obtained  the  key 
determinants  of  the  exercise  of  market power,  namely,  own  and  cross price  elasticities.
21 
Unfortunately,  the  first  difficulty  encountered  when  analyzing  horizontal  mergers  in  case 
studies is the availability of data. The second is the high econometric skills demanded (less 
serious since good econometricians are not rare) as well as time. A third difficulty has to be 
with more theoretical issues. For instance these studies are based on static models of price 
competition only
22 and lack dynamic aspects of the merger. Such dynamic aspects could be 
efficiencies  and  long  term  effects  such  as  an  increase  in product  variety,  investment  and 
innovation may leave prices unaffected or even lessen them, but they are also difficult to 
introduce in the analysis. Since Pakes and McGuire (1994), considerable advances have been 
attained to introduce dynamics aspects in econometric models, but there is still a lack to 
general cases. 
 
1.4.  Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I summarize a broad list of different rationales that have been proposed 
as merger motives. I classified them in two main groups. The key distinction between these 
two groups of merger motives is the effective claimant of the (seeking) merger gains. The first 
group includes drivers that increase the value of the merging firms since their effect is an 
increase  on  the  actual  or  future  economic  profits.  The  second  group  includes  a  list  of 
rationales that go into the interest of the manager of the firm and not in the firm’s value. That 
is, in these mergers the driver is to increase the acquiring firm manager’s wealth even if this 
                                                 
20 The reason is that with the log-linear demand system own and cross elasticities remain the same post-merger 
so the firms can increase prices without missing customers. Whereas the linear system exhibits the highest own 
price elasticity and therefore the least scope to increment prices. However this demand is not very appealing 
because sometimes it can obtain negative values. 
21 In Bertrand competition, the mark-ups firms will set, are inversely related to own and cross price elasticities. 
In  contrast,  unlike  the  situation  with  differentiated  products,  merger  simulation  in  a  Cournot  industry  with 
homogenous  goods  requires  the  specification  of  industry  boundaries,  a  single  and  a  rough  estimate  of  the 
industry’s elasticity of demand supplies market delineation. That is, only the aggregate demand elasticity of the 
industry is needed. 
22 Other dimensions of competition would be advertising, promotion, place (location).   - 27 - 
may cause a decrease in the firm’s value. Our classification of merger motives is proposed to 
emphasize that for the assessment of merger enforcement, the issue that matters is the effect 
on welfare and not whether the transaction will generate gains to the firm or to the manager of 
the firm. 
We  also  review  three  different  empirical  methods  that  have  been  proposed  in  the 
literature to investigate for merger motives, gains, and effects. These are the event-studies, the 
accounting-studies and the case-by-case studies. From the review of their general findings I 
conclude the first two empirical methods, lack a structural analysis of the merger mechanism 
and do not offer, by consequence, a proper assessment for inferring merger gains. Moreover, 
the  general  conclusions  these  studies  draw  are  that  acquiring  firms  in  mergers  do  not 
significantly gain from the deal. These somewhat paradoxical conclusions may come into 
place  because  these  techniques  carry  out  the  analysis  with  reduced  forms  that  incur  into 
misspecification  problems.  On  the  other  side,  empirical  case-by-case  studies  offer  a  very 
appealing accuracy in evaluating merger unilateral effects because they are able to estimate 
structural models of competition and predict the potential market power enhancement due to 
the merger. However, they are much more data, ability and time demanding than reduced-
form empirical studies. 
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